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Public Deliberation, Affirmative
Action, and the Supreme Court
Cass R. Sunsteint
INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I make a simple and somewhat impressionistic argu-
ment. I start with the suggestion that the issue of affirmative action
should be settled democratically, not judicially. Certainly the Supreme
Court should not invalidate most race-conscious remedial programs.
But until recently, there has been little or no sustained democratic delib-
eration on the issue. The citizenry's ambivalence about-or hostility
toward-affirmative action has been expressed mostly in private and not
in public arenas. The enormous diversity of affirmative action pro-
grams, not to mention the separable justifications for and variable effi-
cacy of each program, has not received much public attention. Some
programs work well; some do not; and neither empirical data nor public
judgments about their content and value have been reflected in program
design.
In these circumstances, the Supreme Court's apparently odd be-
havior-its meandering course, its refusal to issue rules-in the affirma-
tive action context might be defended as performing a valuable catalytic
function. The Court's willingness to hear a number of affirmative ac-
tion cases, and its complex, rule-free, highly casuistical' opinions, have
had the salutary consequence of helping to stimulate public processes
and directing the citizenry toward open discussion of underlying ques-
tions of policy and principle. In these ways, the Court's route has been
far preferable to the most obvious alternatives: validation or invalida-
tion of most affirmative action programs pursuant to clear doctrinal
categories.
Copyright Q 1996 California Law Review, Inc.
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago
Law School and Department of Political Science.
1. By "casuistry," I mean decision by reference to the details of particular cases, rather than
by reference to rules or theories. See generally ALBERT R. JONSEN AND STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE
ABUSE OF CASUISTRY (1988).
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That, in a nutshell, is the argument to follow.2 I do not claim that
the Court has always been self-conscious about the virtues of casuistry
thus described. But if the point is correct, it bears a great deal on the
relations between the Court and a well-functioning system of political
deliberation. It connects, for example, to current debates about the re-
lationship between the Constitution and discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation; here too, the Court might use a casuistical method to
spur public discussion. There are, however, serious questions about
whether current public processes are sufficiently deliberative, especially
in the area of affirmative action.
I
SOCIAL NORMS AND PUBLIC DEBATE
People often think one thing but say another, because of the effects
of social pressures and social norms on what can be said in public? For
example, in most contemporary American circles, a strong social stigma
against anti-Semitic statements exists; people who think anti-Semitic
things are unlikely to make such statements on television or in a public
debate. In many groups where religious convictions are both deep and
widespread, people cannot confess their uncertainty about whether God
exists; they may attend church regularly despite their doubts on that
score. In other places, people cannot acknowledge that they are deeply
religious; in such places, social norms punish public declarations of re-
ligious convictions The general point is simple: social norms drive a
wedge between public statements and private beliefs, hopes, and convic-
tions.
From this point, it emerges that "political correctness" is no iso-
lated phenomenon limited to left-leaning intellectuals. It is a pervasive
fact of social life. It appears whenever prevailing norms discourage
people from taking issue with a widely held social belief. Those inter-
ested in democratic politics should notice the omnipresent role of public
constraints on public statements.
Is the existence of such constraints something to be lamented? No
simple answer would make sense. Sometimes, by imposing sanctions on
2. For a similar argument, see Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L REV. 907 (1983)
(discussing lack of congruence between the Supreme Court's methods and results in their affirmative
action cases). The argument is generalized in Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 Hzv. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 1996).
3. An outstanding discussion of such "preference falsification" is TmUaR KuRAN, PRIVATE
TRUTHS, PUBLIc LIES (1995), which includes a section on affirmative action at 138-41. I do not
mean to endorse all of what Kuran says on that score. See Cass R. Sunstein, True Lies, THE NEw
REPUBLIC, December 25, 1995, at 37-41 (reviewing Kuran's book).
4. This is a concern in STEPHEN L CARTER, THE CULTURE or DISBELIEF (1993).
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vicious or invidious judgments, social norms have a healthy
"laundering effect."5 The existence of social sanctions can make peo-
ple embarrassed about those judgments and eventually make them re-
cede or even disappear. If "[h]ypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to
virtue,"6 then social norms can identify both vice and virtue as such, and
enable citizens to tell which is which. Hypocrisy can therefore have
valuable social uses. It has a civilizing effect It can produce justice by
making unjust behavior seem vicious or otherwise unacceptable. ,
On the other hand, social norms of the kind I am discussing can
cause damage in two different ways. First, they may prevent people
from offering arguments that are productive, reasonable, or even right.
If prevailing norms are invidious or rooted in confusion, they may even
perpetuate invidious or confused practices. Consider the many areas in
the world where social norms strongly discourage advocacy of sex
equality;' many women who indicate their belief in equality run enor-
mous risks. Second, social norms may discourage the expression of
doubt, even when doubt exists and when debate is, partly for that very
reason, desirable and potentially productive. In that way, prevailing
norms can damage processes of public deliberation. Even if prevailing
norms are not invidious on their merits-even if they reflect clear
thinking or hard won wisdom-their effects can be pernicious when
they impair public deliberation. In a well-functioning democracy, facts
and options are clarified through doubt, and people have a sense of
what their fellow citizens think..
Of course, a certain suppression of issues and opinions stems from
practical necessities. Not everything can be discussed at once. At any
time, many things must be taken for granted. Some things are properly
taken as so obvious that they "go without saying." But in many areas,
one can safely say that democratic processes would be better if public
debate focused on what really concerns people.
From the standpoint of both law and democratic theory, a great
deal needs to be done on this important topic. We do not know the ex-
tent to which actual private judgments are not expressed publicly, even
when they are quite widespread, and when the reason for silence is that
5. See Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE
THEORY 75 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986).
6. Frangois, Duo de La LaRouChefoucauld, REFLECTIONS; OR SENTENCES AND MORiL
MAXIMS, Maxim 218 (1678), quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 65 (Justin Kaplan
ed., 16th ed. 1992).
7. See Jon Elster, Strategic Uses of Argument, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 237-50
(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
8. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1995, at
105-08.
9. This is, of course, a standard Millian point. See JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2
(Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing 1978) (1859).
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social norms impose sanctions on the public expression of those judg-
ments. It is therefore important to take account of possible disparities
between what is said and what is thought. It is also important to know
how wide such disparities are, whether the disparities reflect biases, and
whether some social institutions or practices facilitate or inhibit open
discussion.
II
THE SUPREME COURT AS CATALYST
It seems obvious to say that when the Supreme Court faces a con-
stitutional attack on a law, it has three basic options: it might uphold the
law, it might invalidate the law, or it might refuse to address the issue by
denying certiorari or by taking advantage of various avoidance strate-
gies.
A detailed literature discusses the third and least obvious of these
options.'0 On a familiar view, the Court should often permit issues to
"percolate" in lower courts and in the nation as a whole. Through this
route, it can allow many forms of legal and political discussion and de-
bate; in that way, the Court avoids premature judicial foreclosure of
hard questions. The Court might take this route for practical reasons or
for reasons of principle. Perhaps a firm judicial resolution would be
poorly received by the community." Surely this point bears on possible
judicial foreclosure of affirmative action programs, say, twenty-five
years ago. Perhaps a judicial resolution would disserve the very cause
that the Court is seeking to promote. This point has been vigorously
urged in the context of abortion, where (it is said) the Court's early ju-
dicial decision in Roe v. Wade2 helped undermine the movement for
sex equality. 3 Certainly judicial decisions can have unintended social
consequences, and this practical point argues in favor of judicial cau-
tion. The Court might also avoid premature foreclosure because of its
own humility. The Court might lack relevant information and wait to
see how a certain practice works out in reality. Or the Court might be-
lieve that certain issues are difficult from the standpoint of (legally rele-
vant) morality and therefore, in principle, it is important to ensure that a
good deal of public deliberation occurs before the Court acts.
These are important points, and as we will see they bear a great deal
on the issues raised by affirmative action. But the Court actually has a
10. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LBAST DANGEROUS BRANCH ch. 4 (1962)
(discussing the Supreme Court's practice to withhold exercise of power of judical review).
11. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991) (describing a Court
"constrained" by various social and cultural conditions, including public opinion).
12. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
13. ROSENBERG, supra note 11, at 339 (noting that "reliance on the Court seriously weakened
the political efficacy of pro-choice forces").
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fourth option: it can issue a highly casuistical decision, one that resolves
little beyond the single case, but that operates as a catalyst for public
discussion. By assuming jurisdiction, by offering a ruling, but by issu-
ing a ruling that is case-specific and along crucial dimensions not
authoritative for the future, it can call public attention to a problem
without foreclosing public judgment. This fourth option is especially
appropriate when the Court is uncertain about whether general rules
would be satisfactory, and when it believes that differences of fact and
content are highly relevant to constitutional outcomes.
There is, of course, a large debate within the Court and within the
scholarly community about the virtues of case-by-case particularism. 14
Defenders of particularism often speak of the need to proceed cau-
tiously in the midst of ignorance about issues not before the Court. 15
But particularism also has a democratic function, and this is so in two
different ways. Judicial particularists can promote democratic virtues of
participation and responsiveness, by ensuring that people are not fore-
closed by rulings involving previous litigants who have somewhat dif-
ferent complaints. The process of judicial particularism allows each
person to have a day in court, invoking the distinctive features of his or
her case. 6 But there is an independent point. Particularist decisions
allow people, through democratic processes, to continue to debate issues,
secure in the knowledge that courts have not attempted to have a final
say. In this respect, case-specific judgments operate as a kind of
"remand" to the public for further proceedings, at least in the sense
that they do not foreclose those proceedings and may even spur them
through the visibility of court decisions.
In administrative law, a remand to the agency for further proceed-
ings is an exceedingly common phenomenon.17 In the remand, the
agency is permitted to do as it originally did, but it must offer a new and
better justification. The court's decision is case-specific; it can easily be
"distinguished" by a resourceful administrator, even on the same set of
facts. Much debate exists over whether this process generally tends to
14. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L REV. 1175 (1989);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HA.v. L. REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CALIF. L REV.
953 (1995).
15. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing
that the Court's opinion does not apply the Establishment Clause test set forth in earlier line of cases).
16. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-6 (1949).
17. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57
(1983) (remanding to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for further consideration
of decision to rescind the passive restraint requirement); Industrial Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (remanding to Occupational Safety and Health Administration to
reconsider the permissible exposure limit established for benzene).
1183
HeinOnline  -- 84 Cal L. Rev. 1183 1996
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
work out well. 8 But when it does, the remand promotes better public
deliberation by drawing attention to difficulties that had not yet received
adequate attention, and by helping to produce better processes of delib-
eration for the future."'
Much of constitutional law has a structure similar to the adminis-
trative law remand. 0 Sometimes the Court effectively "remands" issues
for fresh deliberation.2 Many of the modem privacy cases involving
sexual autonomy can be understood accordingly.' In these cases, the
state defended laws restricting availability of contraception by reference
to the goal of preventing premarital or extramarital activity. The Court
did not deny that the state has a legitimate interest in preventing non-
marital sexual activity. We do not say that a law directly punishing such
activity is unconstitutional. But, the state may not attempt to promote
the underlying interest through the indirect means of preventing contra-
ception. If the state is genuinely interested in preventing nonmarital
sexual relations, it must pursue that policy in a way that receives mean-
ingful democratic scrutiny and reflects actual democratic approval of
the underlying judgment of policy and principle-through the criminal
sanction. The more indirect and discriminatory route of preventing
contraception is an unacceptable means of pursuing the relevant end.
Because of its indirection, a ban on contraceptives does not accurately
reflect a democratic judgment against extramarital relations. In fact, no
such judgment followed the Court's cases because the public was un-
willing to use the criminal sanction to punish extramarital relations di-
rectly.
18. See Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L REV. 239 (1973)
(suggesting that there is "no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation, detailed
findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of... administrative decisions"); cf.
Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984, 1059 (1991) (reporting that their original hypothesis that
agencies would seek ways to reaffirm their decisions on remand "was not borne out," and that in
approximately 40% of remands, the agencies made major changes "primarily because of the
remand") (emphasis in original).
19. See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE LJ. 38,
59-60 (1975).
20. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); Guido Calabresi,
Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105
H, tv. L. R.v. 80 (1991).
21. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: the Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957).
22. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that access to
contraceptives is essential to the exercise of a fundamental right to procreation and is therefore
consitutionally protected); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (finding statute permitting married
persons, but not single persons, to obtain contraceptives violated the Equal Protection Clause);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives
as unconstitutional because it violated the right of marital privacy).
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This is a controversial account of the privacy cases. But it helps
make sense of rulings that are otherwise very puzzling. And at the very
least, it suggests the possibility of a judicial role in catalyzing public de-
bate through narrow rulings designed to focus public attention on the
more fundamental questions.
mi
THE AFFRMATIVE ACTION MUDDLE
It is easy to be skeptical about the Supreme Court's affirmative ac-
tion cases. From the standpoint of the rule of law, the cases are truly a
mess. This was so from the very start. In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,' the Court was badly divided and could not pro-
duce a majority opinion. Of course, the often-criticized "rule" of the
case was that universities may use race "as a factor" in admissions, but
may not create quotas.' While this rule has played a crucial role in
American society and American debate, it represented the view of Jus-
tice Powell alone. The other eight participating justices explicitly re-
jected that rule. Ironically, the case stands for a proposition that only
one justice thought sensible.
Bakke was not an auspicious beginning for those seeking clear
rules. The Court's second affirmative action case, Fullilove v. Klutznick,
compounded the problem.'s In that case, no majority spoke for the
Court, no standard of review was selected for affirmative action cases,
and by the plurality's own admission, its decision was highly dependent
on the facts of the particular case.' In another case with slightly differ-
ent facts, the outcome might be different.27 Remarkably, during the
next nine years, the Court's decisions developed no clear standard of
review and seemed to turn not on rules, but instead on a large set of
factors:
-whether official findings of past discrimination had been made;'
-whether the relevant program was rigid or flexible;29
-whether the relevant program operated as a quota; 0
23. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24. U. at 272.
25. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding a federal law requiring that 10% of federal funds granted
for local public works be used by minority-owned businesses).
26. Id. at 486.
27. Id. (noting that a different outcome might have been reached, for example, if the program
had excluded an identifiable minority group that had been the victim of a degree of disadvantage and
discrimination equal to or greater than that suffered by the groups encompassed in the program).
28. Wvygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (requiring an official finding
of past discrimination by the government department involved before racial classifications can be
used to remedy discrimination).
29. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490.
30. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315-18 (Powell, J.).
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-whether the relevant program had been issued by Congress, by
another politically accountable body, by a court, or by some other in-
stitution;3
-whether innocent victims were injured, and if so in a severe way;32
-and more.33
The use of these numerous factors led to surprising decisions in par-
ticular cases, and outcomes were hard to predict in advance. Notably,
some of these factors relate to the nature of the deliberative process it-
self. The relevant cases received a good deal of public attention, but the
constitutional position of affirmative action programs remained quite
obscure 4
It was not until 1989 that the Court finally settled on a standard of
review. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,35 a plurality of the
Court held that affirmative action programs would be subject to "strict
scrutiny," at least if they had not been enacted by the federal govern-
ment.3 6 But even while announcing a standard of review, it did so in
such a way as to leave the law exceptionally obscure, and to leave the
many decisions that preceded Croson in an uncertain state.37 Hence,
Croson did not reject the Court's casuistical approach to affirmative ac-
tion. And in Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,31 when the Court fi-
nally announced that the same standard of review applied to the nation
31. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 480.
32. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83.
33. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (considering whether a race-
conscious promotion system is narrowly tailored); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986) (approving affirmative action program for a union with a history of continued and egregious
racial discrimination).
34. The legitimacy of affirmative action in the statutory context is more clear. United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979), held that Title VII does not ban voluntary
race-conscious actions by an employer. I believe that the best argument for this result is consistent
with the democracy-reinforcing concerns traced in this essay. In 1964, Congress made no
considered judgment that affirmative action programs were unlawful. When it spoke in terms of race
neutrality, it was thinking not of remedial programs, but of discrimination based on malice. See
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (holding that Title VII forbids discrimination against
whites at least if it is not part of an affirmative action program). In the absence of a considered
judgment by Congress, the Court should not ban voluntary programs of this kind. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT ch. 4 (1995).
35. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
36. Id. at 493-98 (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion).
37. Compare Joint Statement: Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989) (presenting the view of thirty
constitutional scholars that carefully designed race-conscious remedies of state and local
governments are not necessarily unconstitutional), with Charles Fried, Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989)
(arguing that the Scholars' Statement is misleading because Croson severely limits the availability of
race-based quotas and preferences).
38. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
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as to the states,39 it went out of its way to make clear that the standard
would not lead to automatic invalidation, that outcomes would turn on
particular facts,' and thus that we could not foresee certain results in
future cases.
As a result, there is still--eighteen years and numerous Supreme
Court cases after Bakke-a high degree of uncertainty about the law
governing affirmative action. The public reaction to Adarand shows
that a great deal of doubt about whether affirmative action is constitu-
tionally permissible still remains.41 Now, as before, the validity of an
affirmative action program greatly depends on the particular case.
What has the Court achieved? Perhaps the Court has succeeded in
invalidating the most indefensible affirmative action plans and in up-
holding the most legitimate. This would certainly be the optimist's
view.42 But if we step back a bit, we might conclude that the Court has
helped keep the nation's eye on the affirmative action issue--on the
questions of policy and principle that lie behind the debate-while at
the same time failing to preempt processes of public discussion and de-
bate. Above all, the Court has done this because it has decided a large
number of cases, but proceeded in a highly particularistic manner.
V
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND PUBLIC DEBATE
A. The Constitutional Attack on Affirmative Action
It seems reasonable to think that the question of affirmative action
should be settled democratically, not judicially. Despite frequent prot-
39. Id. at 2117 (holding that all government-established racial classifications must be analyzed
under the strict scrutiny standard of review).
40. The Court wrote:
we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' The
unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not
disqualified from acting in response to it.... When race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the
'narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases.
Id. (citations omitted).
41. Justice Department Memorandum on Supreme Court's Adarand Decision, 405 LABOR
RELATIONS RPTR.: FAut EMPLOYMENT PRACrIcEs MANUAL (BNA) 221 (June 28, 1995).
42. I do not believe that this view is correct. The affirmative action program in Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), is probably the least defensible, but the Court actually
upheld it. The Court said that the minority set-aside in the broadcasting area could be defended as a
way of ensuring that the minority community would receive broadcasting of its choice. Id. But-and
this is a central point--there was no requirement that minority-owned stations provide broadcasting
for minority communities. The reason that there was no such requirement was that it would, on the
conventional view, violate the First Amendment. Thus, the Court upheld the minority set-aside as a
proxy (admittedly a very crude one) for an end that was generally believed unconstitutional.
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estations to the contrary,43 the Constitution imposes no clear textual ban
on affirmative action. In fact, the textual arguments are laughably in-
adequate. To be sure, the Constitution calls for "equal" protection of
the laws; but this point is uninformative on the validity of affirmative
action.' The term "equal" cannot possibly mean "the same," if "the
same" is intended to suggest a ban on all classification. By their nature,
laws classify. Even the law of equal protection classifies. Thus, it is no
offense to the Equal Protection Clause if courts scrutinize sex-based
classifications more skeptically than they scrutinize age-based classifi-
cations--even though this difference does not treat people "the same."
The question is what the word "equal" requires in this context. Dic-
tionaries are unhelpful here. The only way to make progress is to go
outside of the text; we must look there to find possible understandings
of the Constitution's equality principle.
Nor is it helpful to say that the Constitution speaks of "any per-
son" rather than of groups." The Supreme Court, together with many
scholars, appears to think that the reference to "any person" means that
the clause speaks of individuals rather than of groups, and that this point
counts against affirmative action.46 This claim contains some truth, but
it is misleading. To be sure, "any person" may complain that a classi-
fication is constitutionally unacceptable. But on what grounds can
"any person" seek special judicial assistance? Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, all claims of unconstitutional discrimination are necessarily
based on complaints about treatment that singles out a characteristic
shared by a group. A glance at the cases, or at any imaginable set of
cases, shows that anyone who complains of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion is necessarily complaining about the government's use, for pur-
poses of classification, of some characteristic that is shared by some
number of group members. The question is whether the government's
use of that shared characteristic is disfavored from the constitutional
point of view. There is no serious question about whether the charac-
teristics of which "any person" may complain are shared characteris-
tics; of course they are. In this sense, claims of unconstitutional
discrimination are always group-based claims, even if they are made by
''any person."
43. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER FOR
THE PEOPLE 58-61 (1988); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDs: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIrMtNATION LAWS 395-437 (1992).
44. See CtURE, supra note 43, at 58-61.
45. U.S. CONsT., amend. XIV, § 1.
46. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2111 (1995); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion); Regents of the Univ. of
Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (Powell, J.) (1978); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 399-
405.
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For example, suppose that Jones has been denied a government
job. As a "person," she has a right to make a complaint under the
Equal Protection Clause. But everything depends on the characteristic
on which government has allegedly seized. For Jones to claim height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, she has to say some-
thing about the classification that the government has used; and she
must say that the classification treats her, as a member of a certain
group, in a "suspect" way. Thus she has a claim to careful scrutiny of
laws disadvantaging her if those laws classify on the basis of sex. But if
she invokes another characteristic, she has no such claim. The same
plaintiff Jones has no right to heightened judicial scrutiny if those laws
classify on the basis of age.47 She is thus entitled to a degree of scrutiny
corresponding to the basis of the classification of which she complains.
In short, almost all classifications involve "groups." The issue is
whether heightened scrutiny represents the appropriate standard of re-
view for the particular classification that the government has used. The
fact that the Constitution refers to "any person" is utterly uninforma-
tive regarding whether any particular foundation for classification
should, or does, meet heightened judicial scrutiny. The Court's use of
the constitutional text as a justification for heightened scrutiny is bad
formalism-the pretense that the legal text resolves the question when
the judgment must actually be based on other grounds.
If the text of the Constitution does not ban affirmative action, what
of the Constitution's history? It might be tempting to say that it is a
lesson of the Civil War that all racial classifications are unacceptable.
But the history shows no such particular understanding on the part of
those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. On the contrary, it tends
to suggest that affirmative action policies were regarded as legitimate.
The Reconstruction Congress that approved the Fourteenth Amendment
concurrently enacted a number of race-specific programs for African-
Americans." A substantial debate about whether such programs were
legitimate occurred, and the people who controlled Congress after the
Civil War concluded that they were. No evidence exists in the Four-
teenth Amendment ratification debates that all race-conscious programs
would be impermissible.49
History need not be decisive. Perhaps a moral argument justifies
the Court in reading the text to ban affirmative action. But no clear
moral argument requires courts to treat affirmative action policies with
47. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (holding that
rationality review, rather than strict scrutiny, was the proper standard for age-based classifications).
48. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 71 VA. L REV. 753 (1985) (discussing the legislative history of these programs with
emphasis on the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act).
49. See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 79 (1992).
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great skepticism. Many critics of affirmative action claim that the moral
argument lay at the heart of the work of Martin Luther King, Jr., and
others in the civil rights movements of the 1960s; ° but this is an histori-
cal error. Asked in 1965 whether it was "fair to request a multibillion-
dollar program of preferential treatment for the Negro, or for any other
minority group," King flatly replied, "I do indeed."51 In 1966, King
wrote,
It is impossible to create a formula for the future which does not
take into account that our society has been doing something
special against the Negro for hundreds of years. How then can
he be absorbed into the mainstream of American life if we do
not do something special for him now, in order to balance the
equation and equip him to compete on a just and equal basis?""
In fact, King's 1964 book, Why We Can't Wait, criticized the idea that
once African Americans had been granted simple equality before the
law, no further action should be taken. He wrote,
On the surface, this appears reasonable, but it is not realistic. For
it is obvious that if a man is entered at the starting line in a race
three hundred years after another man, the first would have to
perform some impossible feat in order to catch up with his fel-
low runner.53
The views of Martin Luther King, Jr., need not be decisive. Perhaps
a moral principle of color-blindness deserves constitutional recognition;
certainly this is so if it is the only intelligible principle behind the con-
stitutional concern for racial equality. But we can identify an alternative
moral principle, one that has actually been responsible for most of the
movement for racial change in America, both during the Civil War and
thereafter. In the area of race, a large target of the Civil War Amend-
ments was the preexisting system of racial caste: a system that turned
the highly visible and morally irrelevant characteristic of race into a
systemic basis for second-class citizenship.' The Fourteenth Amend-
ment is best conceived of as opposing that caste system.55 And if this
represents the best conception of the Fourteenth Amendment, then there
is nothing fundamentally illegitimate about affirmative action pro-
grams.56 Such programs are designed to overcome caste-like features of
50. See, e.g., D1NESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY (1995).
51. ALEX HALEY, THE PLAYBOY INTERVIEWS 115 (Murray Fisher ed., 1993).
52. MARTIN LUTHER KINO, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 146 (1963).
53. Id. at 147.
54. I draw here from Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410, 2429
(1994).
55. See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2439.
56. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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existing practice. This does not mean that they are a good idea, as they
may not have this effect. It may be that they are bad on grounds of
policy and should be rejected in democratic and administrative arenas.
But that possibility does not make them constitutionally objectionable.
In fact, the Supreme Court has yet to provide a clear explanation of
the principle that requires affirmative action programs to be treated so
skeptically.Y Most of its argument depends on a false claim of sym-
metry: if discrimination against African Americans is presumptively
forbidden, how can discrimination against whites be presumptively le-
gitimate? 8 This question is anything but rhetorical. It is no better than
the question, if discrimination on the basis of sex is presumed illegiti-
mate, how can the same not be true for discrimination on the basis of
age? In fact, the anticaste principle helps provide an answer to both
questions, and that answer suggests that different forms of discrimina-
tion are utterly different. To be sure, the Court has referred to a set of
legitimate concerns about affirmative action policies: the social divi-
siveness of affirmative action, the ordinary moral irrelevance of race, the
fact that race is not chosen voluntarily, and the possibility that affirma-
tive action programs will stigmatize their intended beneficiaries. But
none of these points supports a convincing constitutional complaint
about affirmative action.59 Many things that government does are divi-
sive, yet they are not unconstitutional for that reason. Many character-
istics that are morally irrelevant, and that are not voluntarily chosen, are
used by government as classifying devices; consider height, strength,
and intelligence. Affrmnative action programs may well stigmatize their
intended beneficiaries. But the same is plausibly true for programs that
benefit children of alumni or people from underrepresented regions,
and those programs are not, because of their stigmatizing effects, un-
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
57. There is a lurking concern in the cases with interest-group power. See David A. Strauss,
Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 Sup. Cr. REv. 1. Undoubtedly, interest-group power
does underlie some affirmative action programs. But why should this form of interest-group victory
receive careful judicial scrutiny, while other forms do not?
Occasionally, the cases also suggest that racial classifications produce social division. See, e.g.,
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This may well be true. But
an absence of affirmative action programs would also produce social division. In any case, many
government programs appear to promote social division, and they are not constitutionally suspect for
that reason. Some examples include veterans' preference laws, laws supporting public education, as
well as laws supporting art and culture.
58. For an egregious example of such false symmetry, see D'SOUZA, supra note 50, which
offers no argument against preferential treatment even though preferential treatment is one of the
book's central targets.
59. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 545 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. Democratic Debate and Affirmative Action
These remarks certainly do not mean that affirmative action pro-
grams are a good idea. The range of such programs is very wide, and to
make a judgment on them, it is important to have a sense of their variety
and of their consequences. Such programs include relatively uncontro-
versial efforts to increase the pool of applicants by ensuring that the
candidates are diverse; these efforts are certainly race-conscious, but at
the stage of recruitment rather than actual appointment. It is hard to see
why such efforts are objectionable. Other affirmative action programs
include race as a factor among many others. Still other programs in-
clude rigid quota systems as well. Some programs give a minor boost to
highly qualified candidates, and some allow people entry into programs
for which they are ill-suited. Evaluation of such programs should de-
pend partly on their content and their consequences, and the term
"affirmative action programs" is far too imprecise to speak adequately
on that score. Above all, We need to know how such programs are oper-
ating in the real world. Undoubtedly, many affirmative action programs
are successful and perceived as such.
It is striking but true that until the very recent past, the nation had
yet to have a sustained discussion about the legitimacy and variety of
affirmative action programs and of possible alternatives.' When Con-
gress adopted the 1964 Civil Rights Act, discrimination against African
Americans was of course the central focus of the debate.6' Affirmative
action programs were in an embryonic state and did not receive much, if
any, consideration.62 The first important affirmative action program was
actually adopted by Executive Order.63 The proliferation of such pro-
grams at the national, state, and local levels has proceeded without sus-
tained attention to the underlying issues of principle and policy.
Whatever one thinks about the legitimacy of affirmative action, this lack
of deliberation is quite disturbing.'
60. See, e.g., Drew S. Days III, Fullilove, 96 YALE L . 453 (1987).
61. This is clear from both the majority and the dissenting opinions in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger tries to
argue that there was an explicit judgment to forbid race-conscious programs benefiting African
Americans. Id. at 216-19 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). But the snippets in the history, taken in context,
do notjustify that conclusion. See RiCHARD A. POSNER, Tm PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 283-85
(1990) (discussing Weber).
62. The debates that appear to involve affirmative action actually involved (a) federally
mandated racial balance; and (b) racially-motivated actions against whites without remedial goals as
in McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
63. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (West
1994).
64. Cf. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 68 (1986) (discussing the phenomenon
of "decision by accretion").
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In fact, it is plausible to think that some of the public backlash
against affirmative action is attributable to the perception that the rele-
vant programs have never been debated and defended publicly. It is not
at all true to say, as many do, that affirmative action programs are a
creation of federal courts;' many such programs have their origins in
private decisions or in decisions of politically accountable bodies. But
the widespread perception that affirmative action programs are court-
generated is illuminating insofar as it suggests a belief that such pro-
grams have not been ratified publicly.
C. The Court as Catalyst in Affirmative Action
We are now in a position to discuss the possible catalytic role of the
Supreme Court insofar as that role bears on the affirmative action de-
bate. Suppose that it is agreed that the issue of affirmative action should
be decided democratically rather than judicially-but suppose, too, that
institutions are operating in such a way as to ensure that any public de-
cisions are taken in an unaccountable way, and are not really a product
of democratic judgments. The Supreme Court's meandering, casuisti-
cal, rule-free path may well be a salutary way of signaling the existence
of large questions of policy and principle, at least with constitutional
dimensions, when those questions would otherwise receive far less atten-
tion than they deserve. Hence, the participants in Supreme Court cases
have become familiar "characters" in the national debate, helping to
frame discussion: people like Bakke," Weber,67 Johnson,68 minority con-
struction contractors, 9 and others.
Judicial signaling is especially important in a context where social
norms may have an adverse effect on open public discussion. Suppose
that a policy persists not because people are in favor of it, but because
social norms prevent people from voicing their complaints publicly.
Suppose too that these complaints are widespread. If this is so,70 there is
a democratic problem that requires attention. At least as a general rule,
something should be done to ensure that the issue receives public con-
sideration. Private actors can help to remedy the situation. We might
describe as "norm entrepreneurs" those people who try to activate pri-
65. See D'SouzA, supra note 50, at 291 (claiming that "racial' preferences are now
widespread in private sector job hiring").
66. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
67. United Steelworkers of Am. v. weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
68. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
69. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
70. See KURAN, supra note 3, at 138-41 (discussing the reasons why people do not voice these
widespread complaints).
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vate beliefs and judgments in favor of a shift in existing social norms.
But official institutions can play a role as well. In particular, the Su-
preme Court can signal the existence of hard questions of political mo-
rality and public policy, by taking cases, drawing public attention to the
underlying questions, and refusing to issue authoritative pronounce-
ments. And if we examine the Court's practice in the area of affirma-
tive action, we can see that the Court has operated in precisely this way.
It has helped keep the affirmative action issue in the public domain
without foreclosing public deliberation. In this way, the Court has
served a valuable catalytic function.
I do not claim that the Court has been self-conscious about its role.
But some of the justices, especially Justices O'Connor and Powell, have
undoubtedly been aware of the difficulty and variety of the affirmative
action problem and have chosen a casuistical approach for this reason.
Nor do I claim that the current public interest in affirmative action owes
its origin to Supreme Court decisions. There are undoubtedly a wide
range of factors that could be said to have played a catalytic role. All I
contend is that the Court's decisions have been among the factors that
have both kept affirmative action in the public eye and helped focus the
public on issues of principle and policy. And to the extent that those
effects have been salutary, the Court's practice here bears on other me-
andering paths in the past, 3 and also on future practices, perhaps in the
area of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, where a degree
of casuistry also makes a good deal of sense.74
I cannot offer here a full discussion of when casuistry in the inter-
est of public deliberation is a desirable strategy for the Court,75 but a few
brief remarks may be helpful. The casuistical approach makes most
sense when the Court is uncertain or divided about whether any broad
rule is constitutionally sound. It follows that in the affirmative action
context, the Court's approach is more attractive to those who are unsure
about the constitutional status of affirmative action. For those who be-
lieve that it is per se invalid, or clearly acceptable in all circumstances,
71. See CASS K SUNSTmN, FREE MARMETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ch. 2 (forthcoming 1997);
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L REv. 983 (1996).
72. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2108-12; Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (O'Connor, J.) (plurality
opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-320 (Powell, J.).
73. The Court's treatment of federalism provides a notable example. The recent decision in
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), turned on a set of factors-the absence of clear
findings from Congress, the traditionally local nature of education, the fact that the relevant guns did
not have to travel in interstate commerce, and the fact that commercial activity was not involved-
rather than a lucid rule. Whether or not Lopez was right, it might be taken as a salutary signal to
Congress and the nation that the Commerce Clause is limited, and that public deliberation should
attend to those limitations.
74. See Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. LJ. 1, 23-27 (1994)
(defending the view that a casuistic approach by the Court is appropriate in this area of the law).
75. For more detail, see Sunstein, supra note 2.
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judicial casuistry would be harder to defend. Casuistry will seem most
sensible to those who believe that the relevant outcome should turn on
particular facts. In the affirmative action context, we might think that a
rigid quota system is worse than "race as a factor," or that universities
have special reasons to engage in race-conscious programs.
Equally important, the argument for casuistry, as a catalytic ap-
proach, is strengthened by a judgment that judicial decisions will in fact
spur, or at least be a healthy part of, ongoing processes of public delib-
eration. The argument becomes even stronger if those processes at least
have the potential to function well. If this is so, judicial casuistry may
promote, rather than undermine, the system of democratic deliberation.
If, on the other hand, public deliberation is unlikely in any event, or
likely to operate very badly, a more rule-bound approach to the Con-
stitution would be better. Obviously there are empirical issues here that
I have not resolved.
On these grounds, we can see how the Court's casuistical decisions,
defended in the way I have here, might best be criticized. Perhaps the
Constitution is sensibly interpreted to ban all affirmative action pro-
grams (though I have suggested that this would be a most adventurous
reading). Perhaps the Constitution is best understood not to draw such
programs into question at all. Or perhaps democratic processes have
been working very well without the Court, and the Court's decisions
have been marginally relevant, or have even helped to facilitate distor-
tions of democratic deliberation. I do not believe this judgment could
be supported, but it suggests the direction in which a challenge to the
Court's approach might move. It suggests, too, how judicial casuistry
might be evaluated in the context of such issues as discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. I believe, for example, that most such dis-
crimination is unacceptable under the Equal Protection Clause. But it
may very well make sense for the Court to proceed slowly, cautiously,
and in a case-specific way, because of the variety of possible settings, the
practical need to build on democratic judgments, and the value of judi-
cial humility in the face of so controversial a public issue, one that is
now receiving considerable public attention.76
VI
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, DELIBERATIVE GOVERNMENT, AND
THE REFERENDUM
The suggestion that the Court has helped catalyze public debate
should not by any means be taken as a claim that with respect to
76. Id.
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affirmative action, the democratic process has been or is now working
well. With "norm cascades"-large shifts in current norms-there is a
risk that outcomes will be based on sensationalistic anecdotes, on factual
misperceptions, or, worse, on simple racism and hatred. Undoubtedly,
objections to affirmative action programs are often well-motivated; it
would be ludicrous to think that such objections are necessarily rooted
in racial prejudice. But appeals to racism, usually tacit, are a large part
of the debate. Some people might think that affirmative action is an
unpromising area for public deliberation precisely because of the likeli-
hood that racist motivations will be at work. If this is an unpromising
area for public deliberation, the argument for a catalytic effort from the
Court is of course weakened, and judges might attempt to resolve the
problem on other grounds.
The relevant risks are especially severe in the context of a referen-
dum, which bypasses ordinary filters of political representation and
hence raises special risks.n Referenda may well be based on inadequate
information and on popular passions that are insufficiently influenced
by reason-giving and understanding of context. 7' This was of course a
relevant concern in the framing period.79
Much national attention is now focused on a referendum proposal
in California designed to eliminate preferential treatment based on
race.8" Political processes in California on this issue do not appear to be
deliberative. The American system is one of representative rather than
direct democracy, partly because of a judgment that political delibera-
tion can be best promoted through a representative system.8' If judicial
decisions stimulate poorly functioning referendum processes, little will
be gained.
In the context of affirmative action in particular, there is a danger
that referendum outcomes will not be based on a careful assessment of
facts and values, but instead on crude "we-they" thinking. This is a
77. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTION FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991).
78. Id. at 58-59.
79. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
80. In 1996, Californians will vote on the following anti-affirmative action amendment to the
state constitution (dubbed by its supporters as the "California Civil Rights Initiative"):
Neither the State of California nor any of its political subdivisions or agents shall use race,
sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion for either discriminating against, or
granting preferential treatment to, any individual or group in the operation of the State's
system of public employment, public education, or public contracting.
CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, reprinted in CALIFORNIA SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH,
THE STATUS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CALIFORNIA (1995).
81. See THm FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 79; JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF
REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994).
1196 [V/ol. 84:1179
HeinOnline  -- 84 Cal L. Rev. 1196 1996
1996] PUBLIC DELIBERATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
danger in the context of race. It is not my purpose here to evaluate that
risk. But if a catalytic role from the Court serves to intensify poorly
functioning majoritarian processes, that role may be nothing to cele-
brate. Both exercises of statesmanship and institutional correctives-
displacing the referendum process with more insulated bodies-may be
in order. Hence, it is appropriate to assemble politically insulated
groups to try to compile information about the actual effects of af-
firmative action programs.83
Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court can do a
great deal to make things better. Some people have suggested that the
Court might review the outcomes of referenda with an unusually high
degree of skepticism.' There is some sense in this suggestion. An ap-
proach of this kind can find structural support in the Constitution, which
is rooted in faith in representation, and in the Constitution's most fun-
damental underlying concerns. It is plausible to say that the Court
should be mildly more receptive to a constitutional challenge when leg-
islation has come through referenda. But no provision of the Constitu-
tion specifically authorizes judges to regard the outcomes of referenda
as less legitimate than the outcomes of representative processes, and in
any case it is not, under current law, easy to see how someone might
challenge a ban on affirmative action on these constitutional grounds.85
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have tried to connect two ideas. The first involves
the disjunction between private beliefs and public statements-a dis-
junction that stems from social norms that can discourage honest public
argument about public issues and in that way undermine values that
animate the First Amendment itself. The second involves the catalytic
82. See, e.g., the amendment to the Colorado Constitution at issue in Romer v. Evans, 114 U.S.
(1996), which provides in pertinent part:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the
basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Id. at 1623 (quoting Amend. 2 to COLO. CONST., art. II, § 2). The Supreme Court struck down the
amendment as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
83. Cf. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARDS EFFEcTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993) (discussing an institutional remedy for regulatory failure, through increasing the
power of specialists to allocate resources in sensible ways).
84. For a discussion of these suggestions, see Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990).
85. After Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), it is clear that affirmative action is not
required by the Constitution except in certain narrow circumstances, such as when race-conscious
remedies are constitutionally required for remedial purposes. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
1197
HeinOnline  -- 84 Cal L. Rev. 1197 1996
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
animate the First Amendment itself. The second involves the catalytic
role of the Supreme Court. This role is ordinarily thought to involve
three principal powers: validating or invalidating laws, and refusing to
hear cases. But the Court has a fourth power-the authority to issue
highly casuistical rulings that do not settle much, but that operate as a
kind of "remand" to the public, alerting people to the existence of
hard issues of principle and policy. In the affirmative action context,
the Court, whether or not intentionally, has done precisely this. It has
said little that is authoritative. It has, however, helped trigger public de-
bate, with, perhaps, an understanding on the part of some of the Justices
that until recently, the debate was neither broadly inclusive nor properly
deliberative-and that it did not honestly reflect people's underlying
concerns. In other words, the Court can be taken to have responded to
the fact that social norms have helped prevent open public discussion,
and to have tried to promote such a discussion.
From these points, it would be possible to celebrate what many have
seen as the Court's indefensible course of rule-free judgment. Perhaps
the Court has refused to foreclose an issue on which the political
branches should have the final say, but nonetheless played a valuable
role in ensuring that the political branches actually give the issue the
attention that it warrants. Certainly, the Court's decisions have inspired a
great deal of media attention and placed a kind of public spotlight on
affirmative action.
I think that ideas of this sort generally support a degree of casuistry
in some areas of constitutional law, and that casuistry makes a great deal
of sense in the context of hard issues on which the nation is sharply di-
vided. But the approach may be too optimistic in the particular context
of affirmative action. If it is too optimistic, this is so either because af-
firmative action is not problematic from the standpoint of policy and
principle, or because the political process, realistically speaking, will not
be deliberative at all, but instead will serve as a forum for sloganeering,
mutual suspicion, and racial prejudice.
Neither of these reservations can be easily dismissed. But in light
'of the wide range of programs labelled "affirmative action," the first
reservation seems too starkly stated. Even those who approve of af-
firmative action should recognize that some programs are unfair and do
not fulfill their intended purposes. In any case, a public discussion
would serve many valuable functions. It is much too soon to know
whether the second reservation is warranted. But it does seem safe to
say that the area of affirmative action casts a new light on the role of the
Supreme Court. It shows that the Court's catalytic role can help trigger
public debate and heretofore silent protest where debate might otherwise
be absent. From the standpoint of deliberative democracy, what is
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catalyzed may be nothing to celebrate, at least in the context of race.
But remedies for that large problem would take me well beyond the pre-
sent discussion.
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